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SHOOT FOR THE STARS? PREDICTING THE RECRUITMENT




The Pennsylvania State University
This study explores how CEOs’ and outside directors’ desires for the benefits of
signaling and “homophily” intertwine with their concerns over maintaining power
and preserving local status hierarchies to affect the likelihood a firm recruits presti-
gious outside directors to its board. Using pooled cross-sectional data on the five years
following the initial public offerings (IPOs) of 210 firms that went public between 2001
and 2004, we found that prestigious CEOs and directors viewed the recruitment of
prestigious new directors differently and that these perceptions were moderated by
factors that increase the salience of risk of potential losses to CEOs and existing board
members.
How firms convey their “quality” through pres-
tigious affiliations has long captured researchers’
interest (e.g., D’Aveni, 1990; Higgins & Gulati,
2006; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). The central
premise of this research stream is that firms in
ambiguous circumstances, particularly young com-
panies that lack established track records or prior
performance histories, seek to reduce others’ uncer-
tainties by forging exchange relationships with
prestigious or high-status actors, thereby signaling
their quality through these actors’ willingness to
affiliate with them (Podolny, 1993, 1994; Zimmer-
man & Zeitz, 2002). In particular, young firms that
conduct initial public offerings (IPOs) have gar-
nered considerable attention from entrepreneur-
ship and strategy scholars, who have examined the
benefits of affiliations with top-tier venture capital
firms (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Lee, Pollock, & Jin,
2011; Sanders & Boivie, 2004), prestigious under-
writers (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Gulati & Higgins,
2003; Pollock, 2004), and prestigious executives
(Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Pollock, Chen, Jackson, &
Hambrick, 2010) and directors (Certo, 2003; Chen,
Hambrick, & Pollock, 2008; Deutsch & Ross, 2003).
Implicit in all this research is the critical assump-
tion that firms prefer prestigious to nonprestigious
affiliates—an assumption that has not been ex-
posed to much systematic scrutiny. Indeed, even
though recent research has begun to consider the
benefits to prestigious actors of affiliating with non-
prestigious actors (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010) and
the negative performance consequences of having
too many stars on a team (Groysberg, Polzer, &
Elfenbein, 2011), little research has been conducted
exploring the extents to which actors recognize and
weigh the costs of a prestigious affiliation relative
to its benefits or identified circumstances under
which perceived costs outweigh benefits in their
influence on decision making. To the extent that
the costs of prestigious affiliations have been con-
sidered, the focus has been primarily on financial
costs (e.g., Chen et al., 2008; Hsu, 2004), a concern
that speaks to the means of obtaining prestigious
affiliates, but not to the desire to do so. Little re-
search we are aware of has considered how nonfi-
nancial costs can affect the desire to pursue presti-
gious affiliations, even when a firm possesses the
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capability to do so via existing stores of prestige
(Chen et al., 2008; Pollock et al., 2010).
This issue is important because prior research
has shown that when it comes to the prestige of a
firm’s existing directors, market reactions suggest
“more is better” (Pollock et al., 2010). However, we
contend that affiliating with prestigious actors can
involve considerable internal costs, as adding pres-
tigious new actors to a group can disrupt the exist-
ing status order and power structure (Bendersky &
Hays, 2012; Groysberg et al., 2011; Magee & Galin-
sky, 2008). Thus, the perceived desirability of pres-
tigious affiliations is likely to vary more than has
been assumed. We argue that there are diminishing
marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs to
adding more prestigious directors to the board, and
that concerns about the relative costs are height-
ened when existing prestigious directors and/or the
CEO perceive a threat to their power or standing in
the local status order from adding a prestigious new
director (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Cialdini, 2004;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
We situate this study in the context of recruiting
new outside directors during the crucial five years
following a company’s initial public offering (IPO)
(Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Kroll, Walters, & Le,
2007). Recruiting prestigious directors is a complex
sociopolitical process that affects and is affected by
a firm’s CEO and incumbent directors (Stern &
Westphal, 2010; Westphal & Khanna, 2003). While
prestigious directors can signal a firm’s unobserv-
able quality and provide other benefits associated
with “homophily,” the desire to associate with oth-
ers who share similar values, beliefs, interests, and
other characteristics (McPherson & Smith-Lovin,
1987; Stryker & Burke, 2000), they can also entail
costs for firms’ upper echelon members, because
prestigious directors are more likely than nonpres-
tigious directors to assert themselves in ways that
disrupt a current within-group status order and
threaten others’ power and discretion (Bendersky &
Hays, 2011; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Groys-
berg et al., 2011). Thus, while prestigious affilia-
tions generate many “external” benefits, the per-
ceived desirability of prestigious new directors is
likely to be contingent on the extent to which they
are also perceived to create internal, or “lo-
cal,” costs.
We test our arguments using data from a five-
year, pooled cross sectional sample of 210 firms
that went public between 2001 and 2004. Director
recruitment at newly public firms is a useful con-
text for exploring this issue because prestigious
directors play an important role in a young firm’s
development. IPOs bring about transformational
changes that “reset the clock” on these firms’ “lia-
bilities of newness” (Fischer & Pollock, 2004) and
engender substantial uncertainty for external mar-
ket evaluators (Jain & Kini, 2000). The ability to
recruit and retain prestigious directors significantly
reduces perceived uncertainty during this period
(Pollock et al., 2010; Spence, 1973), and a fair bit of
turnover is likely as early investors and others
leave an IPO firm’s board, and/or the board is ex-
panded to include new members (Husick & Ar-
rington, 1998). In addition, because all directors
receive the same compensation for their service
(Hambrick & Jackson, 2000), this context effectively
controls for the association between prestige and
cost as an alternative explanation.
Answering the questions why and under what
conditions firms avoid recruiting prestigious direc-
tors even when they have the ability to do so con-
tributes to several different literatures. Exploring
how the perceived nonfinancial costs of prestigious
affiliations could affect director recruiting deci-
sions contributes to the literatures on corporate
governance and director labor markets (e.g., Coles &
Hoi, 2002; Westphal & Zajac, 1995) by providing
insight into director recruiting decisions and iden-
tifying some unintended consequences of “good
governance” practices. It also contributes to the
literature on status and homophily (e.g., Bendersky
& Hays, 2011; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987) by
exploring how the social-psychological benefits of
homophily can be tempered by countervailing con-
cerns about the threats to existing actors’ power,
and also by increasing understanding of why, and
under what conditions, high-status individuals
want to associate with lower-status actors (Castel-
lucci & Ertug, 2010; Frank, 1985). Finally, our study
contributes to the literature on signaling (Pollock &
Gulati, 2007; Spence, 1973) by developing a more
nuanced understanding of the internal factors that
can influence decisions to engage in activities
that have potential signaling benefits, and the ac-
curacy of certain governance characteristics as
signals.
In the following sections, we first discuss the
underlying logic of signaling and explicate the ben-
efits and costs of hiring prestigious directors. We
then discuss how the prestige and power of a firm’s
CEO and incumbent directors can affect their per-
ceptions and the likelihood they will recruit new
prestigious directors.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Benefits and Costs of Recruiting Prestigious
Directors
Prestige is defined as an actor’s position in a
hierarchical social order that is “tied to the pattern
of relations and affiliations in which the actor does
and does not choose to engage” (Podolny, 2005:
13). Although we primarily use the term “prestige”
in this study, “prestige” and “status” are synony-
mous in organizational research (e.g., D’Aveni,
1990; Podolny, 2005). An actor’s prestige is often
treated as an indicator of its quality (Podolny,
2005), particularly in highly uncertain situations
(Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Podolny, 1994; Zimmer-
man & Zeitz, 2002). To the extent an actor has
affiliations with prestigious actors, it is also per-
ceived as being of higher quality. In this study we
focus on one prestigious affiliate in particular: out-
side directors.
The benefits of prestigious directors. In their
quest to reduce uncertainty, firms adopt organiza-
tional structures—such as boards composed of
prestigious directors—that can convey the firms’
quality (Certo, 2003; Chen et al., 2008; Higgins &
Gulati, 2006). Indeed, Pfeffer and Salancik stated
that “prestigious or legitimate persons or organiza-
tions represented on the focal organization’s board
provide confirmation to the rest of the world of the
value and worth of the organizations” (1978: 145).
Recent research (Pollock et al., 2010) showed that
director prestige had a positive, linear relationship
with initial market valuations of IPO firms, suggest-
ing that when it comes to prestigious directors,
from the market’s perspective more is better.
Prestigious directors also meet Spence’s (1973)
two criteria for credible signals: they should be (1)
observable and (2) costly to obtain. Membership on
a firm’s board of directors is highly visible and
easily observable. Further, prestigious directors
build their status over the course of their careers by
serving on boards of successful companies and
earning elite educational and employment creden-
tials (Certo, 2003; Pollock et al., 2010). Given the
costliness of acquiring prestige, prestigious direc-
tors are selective in accepting board seats, thereby
protecting their relative standing in the director
labor market (Fama, 1980; Pozner, 2008) and mak-
ing them a valuable and somewhat difficult to ob-
tain resource that conveys a firm’s quality to other
market participants.
In addition, prior research suggests that presti-
gious directors can yield more local benefits to a
firm’s executives and directors as a result of
homophily and by enhancing their own individual
status via direct affiliation (Chen et al., 2008;
Deutsch & Ross, 2003). However, such affiliations
can also impose certain costs on a CEO and other
board members. In particular, we argue that presti-
gious directors are even more likely than nonpres-
tigious directors to be actively involved members
who try to assert their influence on a board (Fink-
elstein, Hambrick, & Canella, 2009), which can dis-
rupt the board’s prior working relationships and
threaten its current status ordering (Bendersky &
Hays, 2011; Gabrielsson, 2007; Groysberg et al.,
2011). It is to this issue we now turn our attention.
The costs of prestigious directors. While direc-
tors in general represent the corporate elite, presti-
gious directors represent this elite group’s inner
circle (D’Aveni & Kesner, 1993; Davis, Yoo, &
Baker, 2003). As their relative standing in the di-
rector labor market is actively built over their ca-
reers, prestigious directors carefully guard their
prestige. Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, and Dalton
(2006) showed that directors tend to exit firms
whose credibility is under threat to protect their
personal prestige. Furthermore, directors may ex-
perience a “settling-up” in the director labor mar-
ket whereby their past actions affect their status
and subsequent board appointments (Fama, 1980;
Srinivasan, 2005).
Extending this line of thought, we argue that
prestigious directors are also likely to guard their
status by actively involving themselves in board
activities. Prior research has shown that “people
with higher status have more opportunities to exert
social influence, try to influence other group mem-
bers more often, and are indeed more influential
than people with lower status” (Levine & More-
land, 1990: 600). They also tend to be evaluated
more positively (Levine & Moreland, 1990). With
respect to boards specifically, Finkelstein and col-
leagues note, “prestigious directors are unlikely to
serve solely as ‘rubber stamps’ because (1) they may
very well have been in a position to select among
multiple directorship offers and they likely
would not have decided to sit on a board where
they would have no impact, and (2) prestige may be
accepted as a signal of managerial competence by
firm’s top managers (D’Aveni & Kesner, 1993),
opening the door to a wider director role in strategy
formulation” (2009: 267).
Further, by affiliating with young, unproven
companies, prestigious directors face some risk of
status leakage (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Podolny,
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2005). Prestigious individuals are likely to be con-
scious of their relative standing in a social order
(Frank, 1985; Hambrick & Canella, 1993), so they
will act to establish and/or maintain their presti-
gious positions—working hard to increase a firm’s
success via increased monitoring (D’Aveni & Kes-
ner, 1993; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Finkelstein et al.,
2009) and/or offering advice and counsel to top
executives more frequently (Lynall, Golden, & Hill-
man, 2003)—or will exit the situation (Arthaud-
Day et al., 2006; Hambrick & Canella, 1993; With-
ers, Corley, & Hillman, 2012).
It follows, then, that prestigious directors are
more likely to be active board members who exert
their power when interacting with executives and
other board members, particularly at newly public
firms, where circumstances are evolving and where
active directors are likely to have the greatest direct
influence (Daily, McDowall, Covin, & Dalton, 2002;
Gabrielsson, 2007). This level and intensity of in-
volvement may seem intrusive to incumbent exec-
utives and directors, who have their own perspec-
tives and who have established work routines and
an internal status structure among board members
(Bendersky & Hays, 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).
Although none of this research has considered
boards of directors explicitly, it nonetheless has
significant implications for board functioning
(Hambrick, 1994). Boards of directors establish
norms and routines of interpersonal interaction
(Wagner, Pfeffer, & O’Reilly, 1984) and informal
hierarchies (He & Huang, 2011) over repeated inter-
actions. New directors may be perceived as disrup-
tive and potentially threatening, especially when
they are powerful (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).
Thus, the addition of prestigious directors to a
board can bring both benefits and costs; whereas
prestigious directors provide signaling value, ex-
pertise, and valuable network connections, and can
enhance the status of a firm and its executives and
other directors (Certo, 2003; Graffin, Wade, Porac,
& McNamee, 2008), they can also generate costs in
the form of challenges to the power of the CEO and
current directors, and disruptions to the internal
status structure and operations of the board. Below,
we develop hypotheses to predict how and when
CEO and board characteristics are likely to influ-
ence perceptions of the relative benefits and costs
of prestigious directors, and the likelihood that a
prestigious director will be recruited to a newly
public firm’s board. We argue that current directors
and CEOs weigh the benefits and costs of a presti-
gious new director differently as a function of their
prestige and of circumstances that decrease the per-
ceived costs associated with recruiting a presti-
gious new director.
Recruiting Prestigious Directors
Board prestige. Research on board service has
considered a variety of nonfinancial motivations
that lead directors to serve on or exit boards
(Boivie, Graffin, & Pollock, 2012; Lorsch & MacIver,
1989). This research has suggested that a primary
motivation to accept a board seat is establishing
and/or maintaining membership in the corporate
elite. As such, prestigious directors are more likely
to be attracted to boards composed of other presti-
gious directors (Certo, 2003). This attraction is due
to homophily, or the desire to associate with others
who share similar values, beliefs, interests, and
other characteristics (Stryker & Burke, 2000). These
similarities ease communication and build trust
(Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; McPherson & Smith-
Lovin, 1987) and decrease the duration of dissimi-
lar and mismatched associations (Wagner et al.,
1984). Further, in the case of status, homophily also
tends to reinforce current status orderings (Pearce,
2011; Podolny, 1993).
Newly public firms tend to vary in their stocks of
board prestige at IPO as a function of their founding
conditions and their early efforts to recruit presti-
gious directors (Beckman, Burton, & O’Reilly, 2007;
Chen et al., 2008). Recent research has demon-
strated that firms with existing stores of prestige
have an easier time recruiting other prestigious ac-
tors (e.g., Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Chen et al., 2008)
and experience more positive organizational con-
sequences as a result (e.g., Pollock et al., 2010;
Stuart et al., 1999). Given the signaling and ho-
mophily benefits associated with prestigious affili-
ations, we expect this process to continue follow-
ing an IPO as a board is expanded and/or current
directors leave the board.
However, this relationship is unlikely to be lin-
ear. Recent research has shown that while adding
prestigious individuals can increase group perfor-
mance initially, this effect diminishes as the num-
ber of prestigious individuals increases. Bendersky
and Hays (2011) distinguished among task, rela-
tionship, process, and status conflict in groups and
demonstrated that status conflict not only led to a
decrease in group performance, but also moderated
the effects of task conflict (i.e., conflict over what a
group should do) on group performance. Their
findings are consistent with earlier research sug-
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gesting that executives whose relative position in
the corporate status hierarchy diminishes follow-
ing an acquisition were more likely to leave a com-
pany (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993) and that having
too many stars on a team can lead to a decrement in
group performance (Groysberg et al., 2011).
Thus, we expect that while the prestige of a
firm’s current directors can increase the likelihood
the firm both desires and is able to attract presti-
gious new directors (Chen et al., 2008), as the
board’s pre-existing prestige increases, the costs of
recruiting prestigious new directors become more
salient and the marginal benefits in terms of signal-
ing, homophily, and status enhancement diminish.
We therefore hypothesize,
Hypothesis 1. When a new outside director is
recruited, a firm’s preexisting board prestige
has a positive but diminishing relationship
with the likelihood the new director is
prestigious.1
CEO prestige. Like prestigious directors, presti-
gious CEOs also face competing incentives to re-
cruit prestigious new directors. On the one hand,
the presence of prestigious directors sends positive
signals that ease resource acquisition, create strate-
gic opportunities for a CEO, increase the CEO’s
own relative status, and provide the benefits of
homophily (Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). Further, firms headed by prestigious CEOs
are likely to be attractive to prestigious outside
directors. As noted earlier, directors form an elite
group, or inner circle, of highly influential corpo-
rate leaders (D’Aveni & Kesner, 1993; Davis et al.,
2003). Gaining an additional board seat that ex-
pands a director’s elite network is another benefit
of sitting on a prestigious CEO’s board. Thus, all
else being equal, prestigious CEOs are not only
likely to enhance their own prestige by affiliating
with prestigious directors; they will also have an
easier time recruiting prestigious directors because
of the status affiliation benefits they offer (Graffin et
al., 2008; Podolny, 1993, 1994).
Like directors, prestigious CEOs may also per-
ceive significant costs associated with recruiting
prestigious outside directors that offset the per-
ceived benefits. CEOs tend to be independent, am-
bitious individuals (Hambrick, 1994; Hiller & Ham-
brick, 2005). Further, the desire to maintain their
independence and be their own boss is one of the
major factors that drive entrepreneurs to start new
businesses (Sapienza, Korsgaard, & Forbes, 2003;
Shane, 2008). As such, we expect the CEOs of
newly public firms to resist actions that could re-
strict their discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein,
1987) or diminish their power (Westphal, 1998).
Thus, they too may be apprehensive about what a
new prestigious director may attempt to do if asked
to join their board, and how it will affect their own
standing in the board’s status order.
However, scholars have found that CEOs can
preserve their discretion by engaging in sophis-
ticated interpersonal interactions when their
boards’ structural independence is increased
(Stern & Westphal, 2010; Westphal, 1998), sug-
gesting prestigious CEOs may be less concerned
about adding a prestigious director because they
think they have other means of maintaining their
discretion. Thus, all else being equal, we expect
the benefits of signaling and homophily to out-
weigh the potential costs and prestigious CEOs to
be more rather than less likely to recruit presti-
gious directors. We therefore hypothesize,
Hypothesis 2. When a new outside director is
recruited, the presence of a prestigious CEO is
positively related to the likelihood the new di-
rector is prestigious.
Framing Prestigious Director Recruitment as a
Gain or Loss
Our first two hypotheses are based on conditions
that “hold all else equal.” However, contextual fac-
tors may affect whether the recruitment of a pres-
tigious director is framed as a potential gain or loss
for individual directors and/or CEOs and thus in-
fluence the weights they assign to the perceived
costs and benefits of recruiting a prestigious out-
side director. Two psychological processes—loss
aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and psycho-
logical reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wright,
Wadley, Danner, & Phillips, 1992)—suggest that
factors increasing concerns about the loss of an
actor’s status and/or their discretion to act will
weaken the positive relationships predicted above.
Loss aversion. A central tenet of prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; see Holmes, Bromi-
1 Although firms can and do recruit more than one
director in a given year, there were too few instances in
which more than one new director was prestigious in a
given year to test for the recruitment of multiple presti-
gious directors. We therefore phrase our hypotheses in
terms of recruiting a prestigious director. We address this
issue in our discussion of future research directions.
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ley, Devers, Holcomb, and McGuire [2011] for a
recent review of the literature) is that individuals
weight the potential for gains and losses asymmet-
rically and as a function of whether they are cur-
rently in a gain or loss position. In general, indi-
viduals are more concerned with avoiding losses
than they are with capturing gains (Holmes et al.,
2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Further, these
assessments are made relative to a reference point,
and how a decision is framed can have a significant
influence on the decision made (Bazerman, 1984;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In the context of our
study, this suggests that if CEOs and directors feel
confident they can maintain their position in a
local status order and/or discretion, they are more
likely to focus on the gains to be had from recruit-
ing prestigious outside directors. However, if they
are less confident in this assessment, then the costs
will be weighted more heavily than the benefits
and the likelihood of recruiting a prestigious out-
side director will be reduced. Thus, factors that
increase CEO and/or director confidence that cir-
cumstances won’t change if a prestigious new di-
rector is recruited should result in a more positive
framing focused on the benefits of adding a presti-
gious new director and increase the likelihood a
prestigious director is recruited.
Psychological reactance. Psychological reac-
tance theory (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wright et al.,
1992) describes individuals’ reactions to the per-
ceived threat of losing control or discretion. It sug-
gests that individuals who perceive threats to their
freedom and control will resist pressure to take
actions that increase these threats. Further, psycho-
logical reactance theory suggests that individuals
fight harder to avoid losing something they cur-
rently possess than they do to acquire something
they do not already own or control (Cialdini, 2004).
Research in psychology has also shown that such
reactions are more likely in individuals with high
self-esteem or internal locus of control, two person-
ality traits that typically characterize upper eche-
lons members (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Brockner &
Elkind, 1985; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). Thus, psy-
chological reactance theory suggests that directors
and CEOs will fight aggressively to protect their
discretion and/or status if they perceive them to be
threatened. In this context, that means they would
resist recruiting a prestigious new director if they
felt it threatened the status quo. Below we consider
two contextual factors—one at the board level and
the other at the CEO level—that can influence how
threatening recruiting a prestigious new director is
likely to be perceived to be.
Board tenure. Boards are primarily groups of
individuals (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Ham-
brick, 1994), and while the benefits of recruiting
prestigious directors are clear, bringing additional
prestigious directors onto a board can also increase
status and role conflict and decrease overall group
cohesion and performance (Bendersky & Hays,
2011; Groysberg et al., 2011). Maintaining effective
group processes can be particularly challenging for
boards, both because directors meet only episodi-
cally (e.g. Forbes & Milliken, 1999) and because
their roles are more ambiguous than the CEO role
and thus more apt to be consensually negotiated
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; He & Huang, 2011).
Although the addition of any new director can be
disruptive, the addition of a prestigious director
has greater potential to be disruptive because it is
more likely to affect a current social order. Presti-
gious directors tend to be powerful actors who are
more likely to try imprinting their own perspec-
tives and ways of functioning on the board (e.g.
Westphal & Zajac, 1995) and who will want to
establish their positions at or near the top of the
within-group status hierarchy (Bendersky & Hays,
2012; Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). Thus, they may
be more likely to disrupt group processes and co-
hesion and create personal threats to the relative
standing of prestigious directors already on the
board.
However, the extent to which directors have
worked together for longer periods of time can af-
fect whether boards perceive themselves to be sus-
ceptible to the costs of adding a prestigious new
director, and thus whether adding a prestigious
director will be framed as a potential for gain or
loss. He and Huang (2011) found that clarity in
directors’ relative standings on a board increases
board functioning. Contests over individuals’ rela-
tive standings in a social order are more likely to
occur early in a group’s development, when indi-
viduals are still getting to know each other and
establishing relationships. Directors who have
served together for longer periods of time may have
less uncertainty about their place in their local
status order and may perceive the current order to
be more entrenched and unlikely to change (Han-
nan & Freeman, 1984), enhancing their optimism
that they can maintain their positions in the face of
new competitive threats (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999)
and thereby reducing the perceived costs of adding
a new prestigious director. Prior research on teams
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and working groups has also demonstrated that the
tenure of members in any group is an important
factor influencing team processes such as commu-
nication, cohesion, trust, and social integration
(e.g., Chatman & Flynn, 2001; Harrison, Price, &
Bell, 1998). Furthermore, as communication pat-
terns become routinized over time, new directors
are less likely to form communication linkages
with incumbent board members right away, reduc-
ing the new directors’ immediate influence (Wag-
ner et al., 1984).
Taken together, this suggests that whereas direc-
tors who have served together for longer periods of
time are less likely to perceive the addition of a
prestigious new outside director as a threat to their
relative standing, thereby decreasing the likelihood
loss aversion and psychological reactance will be
triggered, directors who have worked together for
shorter periods may be more susceptible to these
processes. We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3. When a new outside director is
recruited, the positive but diminishing rela-
tionship between pre-existing board prestige
and the likelihood the new director is presti-
gious is stronger the longer existing directors
have worked together.
Additional sources of CEO power. Like presti-
gious directors, prestigious CEOs are also like to
vary in their reaction to recruiting a prestigious
new director depending on whether they perceive a
greater potential for gain or loss. Whereas the pri-
mary concern for directors is more likely to be with
relative standing in the local status order and group
dynamics, for CEOs the primary concern is likely to
be whether they will be able to maintain their dis-
cretion and ability to act as they see fit, which is a
function of a CEO’s sources of power (Finkelstein,
1992; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).
While prestige is one source of a CEO’s power
(Finkelstein, 1992), Finkelstein identified two ad-
ditional sources of executive power: the structural
features of an organization (i.e., structural power)
and ownership (i.e., ownership power).2 Greater
levels of CEO structural and ownership power in-
fluence a variety of governance behaviors and stra-
tegic corporate initiatives (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Ell-
strand, & Johnson, 1998; Fischer & Pollock, 2004;
Nelson, 2003; Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Westphal,
1998), and can influence whether prestigious CEOs
view a prestigious new director as an opportunity
or a threat.
Structural power is derived from the formal or-
ganizational structures and hierarchical authority
that provide a CEO with “the legislative right” (Fin-
kelstein, 1992: 509) to exert influence. Serving as
both a firm’s CEO and chairman of the board, in-
cluding fewer outside directors on the board, and
establishing governance rules that reduce the threat
of hostile takeovers (e.g., Westphal, 1998; Westphal
& Zajac, 1995) are examples of structural sources of
CEO power. Ownership power derives from a
CEO’s direct ownership of stock (e.g., Boeker &
Karichalil, 2002; Pollock, Fund, & Baker, 2009) and
from being a company’s founder (Nelson, 2003). As
Finkelstein noted, “managers who are founders of
the firm or related to founders may gain power
through their often long-term interaction with the
board, as they translate their unique positions to
implicit control over board members” (1992: 509).
Founder status may also confer additional expert
power to the extent the founder is viewed as a
visionary leader who has greater knowledge and
insight into the market and/or characteristics of the
company’s products or technology (e.g., Nel-
son, 2003).
Although in general we expect prestigious CEOs
will focus more on the benefits than the costs of
recruiting prestigious new directors, we expect this
relationship to be stronger the more secure they feel
about their ability to maintain their discretion and
influence. Possessing multiple sources of power
can enhance this sense of security. Thus, a presti-
gious CEO who also possesses structural and/or
ownership power may be less likely to frame the
addition of a prestigious new director in terms of
loss rather than gain. We therefore hypothesize,
Hypothesis 4. When a new outside director is
recruited, the positive relationship between
CEO prestige and the likelihood the new direc-
tor is prestigious is stronger the greater the
structural and ownership power of the CEO.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample
The data for this study were obtained from the
prospectuses filed for all the IPOs conducted be-
2 Although the characteristics we discuss are sources
of power, and thus antecedent to the actual exercise of
power, for ease of exposition we hereafter refer to them as
“structural power” and “ownership power.”
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tween 2001 and 2004 and annual proxy statements
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) for the five years following the IPOs. Prior
research has shown that firms are considered
“newly public” during the initial five years follow-
ing their IPOs and “seasoned” public entities there-
after (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Kroll et al., 2007).
Consistently with prior research (e.g. Fischer & Pol-
lock, 2004), we excluded closed-end mutual funds,
real estate investment trusts (REITS), unit offerings,
spin-offs, demutualization of savings banks and in-
surance companies, and leveraged buyouts (LBOs)
from the analysis. The final sample consisted of
232 firms. Missing data reduced this sample to
210 firms.
Not all of these firms existed as independent
entities for all five years of observation. Seventy-
seven of the firms were delisted from the stock
exchange on which they traded during our period
of study owing to acquisition, bankruptcy, or fail-
ure to meet minimum exchange requirements. De-
listing data were obtained from the CRSP database.
Delisted firms were dropped from the sample after
delisting occurred, and all other firms were treated
as “right censored,” resulting in 826 firm-year
observations.
Dependent Variable: Recruitment of a Prestigious
Director
The dependent variable in this study was the
recruitment of a prestigious director in a given year.
As in prior research (e.g., D’Aveni, 1990; Chen et
al., 2008; Pollock et al., 2010), outside directors
were considered prestigious if they possessed at
least one of the following credentials: a degree from
an elite educational institution on Finkelstein’s
(1992) list of 20 institutions (educational prestige),
experience as an executive at the level of vice pres-
ident or above at a Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500
company (employment prestige), or experience as
an outside director in an S&P 500 firm (directorial
prestige). Although Chen and colleagues focused
on S&P 100 companies, they conducted a single-
industry study that included only software compa-
nies in three four-digit SIC categories. Because our
sample covers 41 industries at the two-digit SIC
level, replicating this level of granularity was not
feasible. When determining the prestige of direc-
tors’ prior employment and outside directorships,
we constructed a lagged-year list of S&P 500 firms
for each year of the study.3
We operationalized director prestige two differ-
ent ways. First, since we were interested inwhether
a prestigious new director was recruited, we con-
structed a time-variant dichotomous measure
coded 1 when a firm recruited a director who pos-
sessed any of the three prestige credentials in a
given year and 0 otherwise. An average of 33.74
percent of firms in any given year reported adding
at least one prestigious outside director to their
boards. There was little variation in this average
across years, which ranged from a low of 29 percent
in year 5 to a high of 36 percent in years 1 and 2.
Second, we created a count variable ranging from
zero to three that captured the number of prestige
credentials a new director possessed. This measure
reflects how prestigious a new director is. Sixty per-
cent of the prestigious new directors in our sample
had one source of prestige, 34 percent had two
sources of prestige, and 6 percent had all three
sources of prestige.
Independent Variables
Board prestige. This measure was calculated as
the aggregate number of continuing prestigious
directors that served on a focal firm’s board in a
given year. We also included the square of this
measure to test for the hypothesized curvilinear
relationship.
CEO prestige. This measure was operationalized
in the same manner as director prestige. CEO pres-
tige was coded 1 if the CEO possessed any one of
the three prestige credentials (educational, employ-
ment, or directorial prestige) and was coded 0
otherwise.
Average board tenure. We operationalized the
amount of time directors had worked together as
the average tenure of board members (Carpenter,
2002; Fischer & Pollock, 2004). This measure was
calculated by summing the number of years each
individual served as a director on a focal firm’s
3 In analyses not reported here we also explored
whether there were differences in the effect of each pres-
tige indicator on the likelihood a prestigious director was
be recruited by using each indicator separately in our
analysis. We did not find any substantive differences
among the indicators in the construction of the presti-
gious director independent variables or dependent vari-
able in effects on the likelihood of recruiting prestigious
outside directors.
2013 1403Acharya and Pollock
board (director tenure) listed in the offering pro-
spectus and the annual proxy statements and di-
viding the sum by the total number of directors on
the board.4
CEO ownership power. CEO ownership power
was operationalized using two measures: the per-
centage of stock owned by a firm’s CEO, and
whether or not the CEO was a company founder
(Finkelstein, 1992). CEO stock ownership equaled
the percentage of shares outstanding at the end of
the year beneficially held by a firm’s CEO (Fischer
& Pollock, 2004). Founder CEO status was coded 1
if the CEO was the company founder and 0
otherwise.
CEO structural power. CEO structural power
was operationalized using three measures: CEO du-
ality, percentage of outside directors, and use of
staggered elections of directors. Companies some-
times stagger the elections of their directors so that
only a minority of directors is up for reelection in a
given year to reduce the likelihood of hostile take-
overs. CEO duality was coded 1 if a CEO was also
the chairman of his/her firm’s board in a given year
and 0 otherwise. The outside director ratio equaled
the number of outside directors on a firm’s board,
defined as directors lacking any current or past
executive positions in the firm and not related to
any current employees (e.g., Daily et al., 2002),
divided by the total number of directors on the
board. Staggered board was a dummy variable
coded 1 if a firm’s board had staggered elections
and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
Time-invariant IPO characteristics. Following
prior research (Chen et al., 2008; Pollock, Rindova,
& Maggitti, 2008), we controlled for several charac-
teristics of an IPO that could create initial condi-
tions with long-term consequences for a firm’s de-
velopment and ability to attract prestigious
directors (e.g., Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 1999;
Fischer & Pollock, 2004). Offer size was calculated
as the product of the total number of shares offered
during an IPO and its offering price. Offer size can
signal the market about a firm’s quality and stabil-
ity (e.g. Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Ibbotson & Ritter,
1995). To reduce the effect of extreme values, we
transformed this variable into its natural logarithm.
Underpricing was calculated as the percentage
change in a stock’s price ([end price – initial price)/
[initial price]) on the first day the stock traded
publicly on a national exchange (e.g., Loughran &
Ritter, 1995). The data used to calculate underpric-
ing were drawn from CRSP. Underpricing has been
found to create buzz and enhance expectations of a
firm’s potential, and thus its ability to acquire re-
sources during the years following IPO (e.g., Je-
gadeesh, Weinstein, & Welch, 1993; Pollock & Gu-
lati, 2007). VC backing was a dummy variable
coded 1 if a firm received financial backing from
venture capitalists (VCs) prior to IPO and 0 other-
wise. Prior research has shown that VC backing
significantly affects the prospects of a firm at IPO
and beyond (Jain & Kini, 2000). VC prestige was a
dummy variable coded 1 if any of the venture cap-
italists backing a firm were listed as prestigious by
Pollock and colleagues (2010) and 0 otherwise.5
Prestigious venture capitalists have been shown to
positively affect IPO performance and the ability to
attract other prestigious actors (Jain & Kini, 2000;
Pollocket al., 2010).Underwriterprestigewasopera-
tionalized using ratings developed by Carter and
Manaster (1990) and updated by Ritter (http://bear.
warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). We coded
the lead underwriter in a given IPO as prestigious if
it received the top ranking in the modified Carter-
Manaster ranking system for 2001–04 and 0 other-
wise. Controlling for underwriter prestige is impor-
tant as these are prominent intermediaries that
have been found to attract other prominent actors
(Chen et al., 2008; Pollock et al., 2010).6
4 In analyses not reported here we also calculated an
alternative measure using the average of the pair-wise
overlap in service among each director (e.g., Barkema &
Shvyrkov, 2007). The results were the same as re-
ported here.
5 In analyses not included here, we used the counts of
prestigious VCs and underwriters (controlling for the
total numbers of VCs and underwriters). These measures
were not significant, and our primary analyses remained
substantively the same.
6 Another source of prestige that could be relevant for
our analysis is top management team (TMT) prestige
(e.g., Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Pollock et al., 2010). While
an offering prospectus provides detailed information on
a firm’s entire top management team, we were unable to
find a reliable source of information on full TMT mem-
bership or members’ backgrounds for the years following
IPO. In analyses not reported here, we included controls
for TMT prestige and TMT size at IPO. Neither measure
had a significant relationship with recruiting a presti-
gious director. Our other results were unchanged.
1404 OctoberAcademy of Management Journal
Time-varying firm characteristics.We also con-
trolled for a number of firm-level characteristics
that varied over time. Firm size was measured as
the natural logarithm of annual sales. This measure
was log-transformed to reduce the effects of ex-
treme values. As some of the firms did not have any
sales in their year of IPO, we added a 1 to the sales
of each company before transforming the values.
Firm age at IPO was measured as the difference in
the number of years between the year of incorpora-
tion and the year of IPO. We again log-transformed
the variable to minimize the effects of extreme val-
ues. Firm performance equaled total stockholder
return (TSR) for a given year. A commonly used
stock market indicator of firm performance (e.g.,
Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), TSR was calculated as
year-end stock price minus year-start stock price,
plus dividends paid, divided by year-start stock
price. Board size, calculated as the total number of
directors on a firm’s board, has been used in prior
research to signify the extent to which resources are
available and affect the extent to which firms can
signal quality via prestigious outside directors
(Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001).7
CEO tenure. CEO tenure is another potential
source of power and can also affect the working
relationships that a CEO has established with a
board. This measure was operationalized as the
number of years a CEO had held his/her position at
a given firm.
Multiple hires. All else being equal, firms that
recruit more than one director in a given year may
be more likely to add a prestigious director. Multi-
ple hires was a dummy variable coded 1 if a firm
recruited more than one director in a given year
and 0 otherwise.
Total departures. Recruiting new directors is
likely to be a function of director exits; that is, firms
are more likely to recruit new directors when in-
cumbent directors leave their boards. This measure
was operationalized as the number of directors
serving in a previous year who did not stand for
reelection and was included in the first-stage mod-
els predicting director recruitment.8
Industry dummies. Industry dummies were in-
cluded because systematic differences could exist
between companies in different industries for both
the independent and dependent variables. In keep-
ing with prior research (Fischer & Pollock, 2004;
Pollock, 2004) five industry dummy variables were
included in the analysis: business services, chemi-
cal and allied products, instruments and related
products, electronic and other electric products,
and retail. These categories parsimoniously capture
the variety of industries represented in the IPO
market in 2001–04. Firms were assigned to these
categories on the basis of their SIC classifications.
Year of issue and years since IPO. Dummy vari-
ables for the year of issue were coded 1 if compa-
nies went public in 2002, 2003, or 2004 (2001 was
the omitted year). We also created dummy vari-
ables for each of the years since IPO, coded 1 if
companies were in their second, third, fourth, or
fifth years following their IPO year (year one was
the omitted year). We controlled for these variables
because a variety of factors associated with when a
company went public and how far beyond its IPO it
has moved may affect the likelihood it will recruit
a prestigious director.
Method of Analysis
Our hypotheses compare the recruiting of a pres-
tigious director to the recruiting of a nonprestigious
director. Thus, they are predicated on a recruiting
event occurring. However, every firm did not re-
cruit new directors every year. Approximately
55 percent of firms recruited new directors in a
given year, with the annual percentages ranging
from 50.3 percent in year four to 61.5 percent in
year two. To compare the effects of director and
CEO prestige and CEO power on the recruitment of
prestigious versus nonprestigious directors, we ran
two-stage models that predicted whether or not a
firm was likely to recruit a new director in the first
stage and then predicted director prestige in the
second stage. For the analyses using the dichoto-
mous dependent variable, we employed the “heck-
prob” command in STATA 11.0, which generates a
Heckman correction for probit models in which the
7 Because group size can influence group functioning
in a nonlinear fashion (Yetton & Bottger, 1983), in anal-
yses not reported here we also included board size
squared. The squared term was not significant, and our
results remained unchanged. We also considered sales
growth and net income as two additional firm-level in-
dicators of quality. Neither variable had significant ef-
fects, and our other results remained unchanged when
they were included in the models.
8 In analyses not reported here, we also considered
prestigious departures. The results of our hypothesis
tests were unchanged.
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outcomes in both stages are dichotomous variables.
For the analysis using the count measure, we only
used the observations in which a recruiting event
occurred and employed negative binomial regres-
sions using the “nbreg” command with robust stan-
dard errors. STATA does not provide a two-stage
selection model for negative binomial regressions;
therefore we calculated the inverse of the Mills
ratio using the code provided by Hamilton and
Nickerson (2003) in a separate probit regression
and included it as a control in the count models. In
both analyses, we used the number of directors
leaving a board, board size, VC backing, CEO pres-
tige, the industry dummies, and the post-IPO year
dummies to predict the likelihood of recruiting an
outside director in the first-stage models. The num-
ber of departures was excluded from the second-
stage models (Bascle, 2008; Hamilton & Nicker-
son, 2003).
RESULTS
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and a
correlation matrix for all the key variables in the
study. To save space and make the tables more
readable we do not include the year of IPO, year
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Firm-Level Variables
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Prestigious hire 0.34 0.47
2. Count prestigious hires 0.45 0.69 .90*
3. Firm agea 2.69 0.77 .02 .05
4. Firm sizea 5.23 1.90 .03 .05 .41*
5. Offer sizea 18.34 0.82 .01 .02 .29* .45*
6. Underpricing 0.13 0.18 .00 .00 .01 .15* .16*
7. Total stockholder
return
2.35 0.16 .06 .05 .07* .14* .24* .01
8. Multiple hires 0.23 0.42 .55* .52* .05 .06* .06* .01 .11*
9. Total departures 0.66 0.91 .21* .22* .03 .02 .05 .02 .06 .31*
10. Board size 7.82 1.75 .22* .21* .09* .21* .23* .04 .05 .31* .06
11. CEO tenure 6.20 5.37 .05 .09* .11* .07* .06* .11* .00 .03 .14* .12*
12. VC backing 0.51 0.50 .03 .02 .14* .22* .22* .09* .04 .02 .00 .05 .00
13. VC prestige 0.21 0.41 .00 .01 .16* .15* .16* .06* .04 .04 .03 .06* .04 .51*
14. Underwriter prestige 0.68 0.47 .05 .07 .04 .25* .41* .13* .10* .06 .07 .11* .08* .05
15. CEO duality 0.44 0.50 .06 .03 .00 .07* .04 .01 .08* .02 .06 .05 .26* .20*
16. Founder CEO 0.43 0.49 .07* .03 .30* .16* .12* .13* .06 .06 .12* .15* .39* .05
17. CEO ownership 0.07 0.10 .12* .07 .11* .11* .09* .06* .04 .04 .09* .15* .29* .01
18. Staggered board 0.69 0.46 .03 .05 .12* .11* .06 .05 .00 .02 .02 .06 .03 .11*
19. Outside director ratio 0.79 0.09 .06 .00 .17* .12* .14* .01 .01 .09* .02 .23* .02 .03
20. Average board tenure 4.70 2.21 .05 .16* .23* .04 .15* .01 .13* .12* .12* .10* .39* .17*
21. Board prestige 3.10 2.19 .33* .36* .17* .12* .01 .08* .01 .16* .03 .33* .07* .16*
22. Board prestige squared 14.42 16.57 .29* .33* .16* .08* .04 .11* .02 .16* .01 .36* .05 .12*
23. CEO prestige 0.35 0.48 .07* .08* .11* .10* .02 .07* .01 .00 .01 .01 .02 .04
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
13. VC prestige
14. Underwriter prestige .01
15. CEO duality .17* .03
16. Founder CEO .08* .09* .43*
17. CEO ownership .02 .25* .34* .50*
18. Staggered board .01 .09* .00 .10* .06*
19. Outside director ratio .03 .12* .16* .24* .34* .05
20. Average board tenure .07* .00 .03 .05 .09* .03 .01
21. Board prestige .05 .10* .04 .09* .10* .05 .09* .05
22. Board prestige squared .06 .12* .04 .08* .06 .04 .07* .04 .93*
23. CEO prestige .01 .06* .09* .00 .03 .03 .01 .05 .43* .38*
a Logarithm.
* p  .05
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post-IPO and industry dummies in any of the ta-
bles, although they were included in all the regres-
sion models. For ease of interpretation, means and
standard deviations were calculated using raw
data, and log-transformed values were used for all
the analyses.
To save space, we do not present the first-stage
models predicting the likelihood of recruiting a
new director. In all the selection models, board
size, number of departures, the dummy variables
for the electronic and other electrical products in-
dustry, and the first two years post-IPO had posi-
tive, significant effects on the likelihood of outside
director recruitment. CEO prestige had a negative,
significant relationship with the likelihood of di-
rector recruitment.
Table 2 presents the results of the second-stage
models testing the hypotheses using the dichoto-
mous outcome, and Table 3 presents the results
using the count measure. In each table, model 1
represents the baseline model and includes only
the control variables. Model 2 adds the main effects
of preexisting board prestige and CEO prestige to
predict the likelihood of recruiting prestigious di-
rectors, as stated in Hypotheses 1 and 2. Models
3–8 add each of the interactions used to test Hy-
potheses 3 and 4, and model 9 presents the fully
saturated model.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that preexisting board
prestige will be positively associated with the like-
lihood of recruiting prestigious directors, but at a
diminishing rate. Boards had three prestigious di-
rectors on average, and the number of prestigious
directors ranged from 0 to 11. The average board
size was approximately 8, so slightly over a third of
the directors, on average, were prestigious. The co-
efficient for preexisting board prestige was positive
and significant in all models, and the squared term
was negative and significant in all models in both
Tables 2 and 3, a finding that is consistent with a
positive but diminishing curvilinear relationship.
To test the curvilinearity of this relationship, we
employed the method developed by Lind and
Mehlum (2009) using the “utest_rev” command in
STATA 11.0. This test calculates the inflection
point and determines whether each part of the
curve before and after the inflection point, as well
as the overall relationship, is significantly different
from either a monotone or U-shaped relationship.
The analysis of the coefficients in model 2 of Ta-
ble 2 confirmed a positive but diminishing relation-
ship. The inflection point was 10, which is within
the bounds of our data, and while the lower portion
of the curve was significantly different from a
monotone relationship, the portion above the in-
flection point was not. However, when the results
from model 2 of Table 3 are used, the relationship
is fully curvilinear. The inflection point is 8, and
the tests for both the upper and lower portions of
the curve, as well as the overall test for curvilinear-
ity, are significant at p  .002 or better. Thus,
Hypothesis 1 is supported, and our results further
suggest that when considering how prestigious a
new director is likely to be, the relationship actu-
ally becomes negative at high levels of board
prestige.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that CEO prestige will be
positively related with the recruitment of presti-
gious directors. This hypothesis is not supported in
our main effects models; CEO prestige has a nega-
tive, nonsignificant relationship with recruiting a
prestigious director in Table 2 and with the amount
of director prestige in Table 3. This finding held
even when CEO prestige was excluded from the
first-stage model. However, the main effect be-
comes significant in some models including inter-
actions. We consider the implications of these find-
ings when we discuss the tests of Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 3 argues that the amount of time out-
side directors have served together on a board will
increase the positive relationship between director
prestige and the likelihood of recruiting a presti-
gious director. We tested this hypothesis with in-
teractions between average board tenure and the
linear and squared board prestige measures. The
results in model 3 of both Tables 2 and 3 show that
average board tenure has a negative and significant
interaction with the linear term and a positive,
significant interaction with the squared term. Fur-
ther, the main effect of average board tenure be-
comes positive and significant. To fully consider
the nature of this relationship, we graphed the re-
sults from model 3 of Table 2 using average board
tenure and board prestige one standard deviation
below and above their means. Figure 1 illustrates
this interaction and shows that although the rela-
tionship remains curvilinear in both instances,
firms are more likely to recruit a prestigious direc-
tor when average board tenure is high. Further, the
inflection point at which the marginal effect of
adding a prestigious director becomes negative and
is shifted left, to approximately seven prestigious
directors. Curvilinearity tests confirm that this re-
lationship is also now fully curvilinear. The results
based on the findings in Table 3 are the same, and
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TABLE 2
Results of Second-Stage Heckman Models Predicting Recruitment of Prestigious Directorsa
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Firm ageb 0.13 0.25* 0.25* 0.25* 0.25* 0.25* 0.25* 0.24* 0.24*
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Salesb 0.14** 0.13** 0.14** 0.13* 0.13** 0.11* 0.12* 0.12* 0.11*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Offer sizeb 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.12
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Underpricing 0.06 0.27 0.39 0.27 0.27 0.42 0.32 0.27 0.53
(0.40) (0.46) (0.44) (0.47) (0.46) (0.44) (0.46) (0.45) (0.42)
Total stockholder returnsc 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.26
(0.31) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.33) (0.35) (0.36) (0.33)
Multiple hires 0.92*** 1.08*** 1.10*** 1.08*** 1.08*** 1.12*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.14***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Board size 0.08† 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08† 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
CEO tenure 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
VC backing 0.33† 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.11
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
VC prestige 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13
(0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
Underwriter prestige 0.03 0.25 0.29† 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.28† 0.30†
(0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
CEO duality 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Founder CEO 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01
(0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20)
CEO ownership 2.25** 1.68* 1.56* 1.69* 1.66* 1.38† 1.68* 1.66* 0.89
(0.88) (0.76) (0.77) (0.80) (0.77) (0.76) (0.76) (0.75) (0.85)
Staggered board 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.05
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16)
Outside director ratio 1.21† 1.38† 1.50† 1.38† 1.37† 0.10 1.38† 1.43† 0.20
(0.70) (0.81) (0.80) (0.81) (0.81) (0.97) (0.82) (0.81) (0.98)
Average board tenure 0.03 0.02 0.19** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.18**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Board prestige 0.52*** 0.87*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.85***
(0.08) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.16)
Board prestige squared 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
CEO prestige 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.20 3.55* 0.25 0.05 3.85**
(0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.20) (1.41) (0.18) (0.28) (1.37)








CEO prestige  CEO ownership 0.04 2.18
(1.85) (1.90)
CEO prestige  CEO duality 0.07 0.03
(0.25) (0.29)




CEO prestige  founder CEO 0.27 0.20
(0.29) (0.38)
CEO prestige  staggered board 0.22 0.22
(0.33) (0.32)
Continued
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the inflection point drops to six. Hypothesis 3 is
therefore supported.
Hypothesis 4 argues that the structural and
ownership power of a CEO will enhance the ef-
fect of CEO prestige on the likelihood that a firm
recruits a prestigious director. The results in Ta-
ble 2 provide partial support for Hypothesis 4.
When the CEO prestige by outside director ratio
interaction is included in the model, the main
effect of CEO prestige is positive and significant
(p  .03), and the interaction is negative and
significant (p  .02). None of the other interac-
tions were significant. Figure 2 graphs this inter-
action for values one standard deviation above
and below the mean for the outside director ratio.
When the outside director ratio is low, CEO pres-
tige has a positive relationship with recruiting a
prestigious director; however, when the outside
director ratio is high, the relationship between
CEO prestige and recruiting a prestigious director
is negative. This finding is consistent with our
argument that a prestigious CEO will weight the
benefits of a prestigious new outside director
more heavily than the costs when she /he feels
more secure about being able to maintain her/his
discretion but will weight the costs more heavily
than the benefits when discretion may be at
greater risk.
The results in Table 3 reveal a different pattern
of results, although they still provide some sup-
port for the positive moderating effect suggested
in Hypothesis 4. CEO prestige remained negative
and became significant (p  .05) when the inter-
actions with CEO duality and founder CEO were
included in the models. Both interactions were
positive, and the interaction with founder status
was significant (p  .05), but the interaction with
CEO duality was not significant (p  .11). Since
both the CEO prestige and founder CEO measures
are dummy variables, we assessed the interac-
tion’s effect by comparing the coefficients. In
keeping with Hypothesis 4, when a prestigious
CEO is not a firm’s founder, new director prestige
is reduced; however, when the prestigious CEO is
also the founder, the new director is likely to be
more prestigious.
The main effects for some of the structural and
ownership power measures were also significant in
Table 3. The outside director ratio had a negative,
significant relationship (p .001) and founder CEO
status had a positive, significant relationship (p 
.002) with the amount of new director prestige.
These findings are consistent with our arguments
that more powerful CEOs are less threatened by a
more prestigious new director.
Thus far we have treated preexisting board pres-
tige and CEO prestige categorically: either you are
prestigious by virtue of possessing at least one type
of prestigious affiliation, or you are not. This ap-
proach is consistent with prior research (e.g., Chen
et al., 2008; Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Pollock et al.,
2010) and our research question. However, like
newly recruited directors, CEOs and existing direc-
tors may have more than one type of prestigious
affiliation. To explore whether the cumulative
amount of prestige held by a board and a CEO was
consequential, we calculated cumulative prestige
on the basis of all of the prestigious affiliations of a
CEO and a board and reran our models. The results
of this analysis were the same as reported here for
both dependent variables.
Another assumption we made in our analysis
was that all three types of prestige were equiva-
lent. However, it is possible that different pres-
tige values are associated with each type of pres-
tigious affiliation. We explored this issue by
TABLE 2
(Continued)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Constant 0.28 0.13 0.89 0.13 0.17 1.63 0.14 0.22 3.01
(1.75) (1.94) (1.92) (1.94) (1.94) (2.01) (1.93) (1.90) (1.94)
Log pseudo-likelihood 746.54 700.79 697.55 700.79 700.76 697.07 700.41 700.46 693.29
a n  826.
b Logarithm.
c Lagged variable.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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TABLE 3
Results of Negative Binomial Regression Models Using the Count Measure of Prestigea
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Firm ageb 0.03 0.15* 0.15* 0.15* 0.16* 0.16* 0.15* 0.16* 0.17*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Salesb 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Offer sizeb 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Underpricing 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.23
(0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Total stockholder returnsc 0.20 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.13
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Multiple hires 0.99*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.62***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Board size 0.06† 0.08** 0.07* 0.07** 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.08** 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CEO tenure 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
VC backing 0.27** 0.18† 0.20* 0.18† 0.18† 0.18† 0.18† 0.18† 0.19†
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
VC prestige 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Underwriter prestige 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.10
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
CEO duality 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.08
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Founder CEO 0.13 0.25* 0.26* 0.25* 0.25* 0.26* 0.14* 0.26* 0.18
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
CEO ownership 1.75* 0.89 0.75 1.06 0.88 0.80 0.87 0.91 0.39
(0.82) (0.56) (0.56) (0.73) (0.56) (0.56) (0.57) (0.56) (0.73)
Staggered board 0.19* 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.12
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11)
Outside director ratio 1.10* 1.43*** 1.43*** 1.46*** 1.45*** 0.98† 1.48*** 1.41*** 0.98†
(0.44) (0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.37) (0.56) (0.37) (0.38) (0.56)
Average board tenure 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.13
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
Inverse Mill’s ratio 0.40* 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Board prestige (H1) 0.53*** 0.87*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.86***
(0.06) (0.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15)
Board prestige squared
(H1)
0.04*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
CEO prestige (H2) 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.19* 0.68 0.21* 0.14 0.45
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.62) (0.10) (0.13) (0.65)
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creating a weighted average value of prestige for
each director (both existing and newly recruited)
and CEO. Given that rarity is often associated
with value, we used the relative frequency of
each type of prestige to create weighting factors,
operationalized as one minus the frequency of
occurrence in our sample. Approximately 64 per-
cent of the directors and executives had educa-
tion prestige; 24 percent possessed employment
prestige; and 12 percent possessed directorship
prestige. Thus, education prestige received the
lowest weighting, and directorship prestige re-
ceived the highest weighting. The weights were
then multiplied by the sources of prestige for
each individual and divided by the total sum of
the weights to get the weighted average. We used
the “heckman” command in STATA to conduct
this analysis since the dependent variable is now
a continuous measure. The results for board pres-
tige continue to remain robust and are the same
as presented here. As in the event count models,
CEO prestige has a negative main effect, but it is
now consistently significant (p  .05). However,
the interaction with outsider ratio is not signifi-
TABLE 3
(Continued)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9








Constant 0.24 0.20 0.64 0.26 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.32 0.81
(1.06) (1.18) (1.21) (1.17) (1.17) (1.32) (1.16) (1.20) (1.35)
Log pseudo-likelihood 513.95 441.94 440.60 441.87 441.35 441.59 440.96 441.89 439.17
a n  451.
b Logarithm.
c Lagged variable.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
FIGURE 1
Interaction between Board Prestige and Average Board Tenure
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cant, and the main effect for CEO prestige is not
significant when the interaction is included.
DISCUSSION
Following Podolny’s (1993) status-based model
of market competition, researchers have largely as-
sumed that firms seek to forge associations with
prestigious actors if they have the ability to do so.
Thus, whereas prior research has focused on the
benefits of homophily and the potential to increase
their own status as the driving logics for firms’
seeking prestigious affiliations (Fischer & Pollock,
2004; Khaire, 2010; Stuart et al., 1999), it has not
considered whether prestigious directors may be
perceived as less desirable in some circumstances
or offered theory explaining why CEOs and boards
may not want to recruit a prestigious director even
when they have the ability to do so.
We theorize about the role local status hierar-
chies and CEO and director power play in shap-
ing this decision. Accounting for the power bases
of these central actors enables us to theoretically
parse the relative effects of homophily and power
in the context of recruiting prestigious directors,
highlighting the costs of forging prestigious affil-
iations and contributing to the growing entrepre-
neurship and strategy literatures examining the
contextual factors affecting the governance of
young firms (e.g., Certo et al., 2001; Chen et
al., 2008).
Theoretical Implications
We argued that recruiting prestigious directors
can alter the work routines and local status hier-
archies within a board, thereby affecting the rel-
ative power and standing of incumbent directors.
Our finding that the amount of existing prestige a
board possessed had positive, curvilinear rela-
tionships with the likelihood of recruiting a pres-
tigious director and with the total prestige of the
new director supports our argument. The mar-
ginal increase in the likelihood of recruiting a
new prestigious director became smaller for each
additional existing prestigious director. And al-
though we did not hypothesize a fully curvilinear
relationship, our results showed that at extreme
levels (approximately two standard deviations
above the mean) the relationship between exist-
ing board prestige and new director prestige be-
came negative, suggesting the perceived costs of a
prestigious new director outweighed the benefits
at these levels. Although our findings should be
treated as preliminary, taken together these re-
sults suggest that both whether a prestigious new
director is recruited and how prestigious that
new director is both change as a function of the
FIGURE 2
Interaction between CEO Prestige and Outside Director Ratio
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amount of existing board prestige. Further, these
changes occur at somewhat different rates, with
the amount of prestige decreasing a little more
rapidly. Future research should continue to ex-
plore these dynamics.
We also found that the amount of time directors
had worked together influenced these relation-
ships. Our results suggest that high average board
tenure increases the likelihood a prestigious direc-
tor will be recruited, as well as the total prestige of
the director recruited. When a board has lower
average tenure, the local status order may still be in
flux, and adding a new prestigious director at this
juncture may be perceived as more threatening be-
cause individual directors’ positions in the status
order may be more precarious and political con-
tests more prevalent. Conversely, serving together
for longer periods of time could create clarity and
stability in the local status order that decrease the
perceived threat of adding a prestigious new direc-
tor. These findings suggest local status order con-
cerns can create boundary conditions on how ho-
mophily influences director recruitment decisions,
affecting a board’s signaling value (Pollock et al.,
2010) and the board capital available (Hillman &
Dalziel, 2003).
When a new director was recruited, CEO prestige
had a negative relationship with the likelihood the
director was prestigious when CEO structural
power was low. However, when a firm recruited a
new director and its CEO possessed more structural
power—reflected in a low outside director ratio—
the relationship between CEO prestige and the like-
lihood of recruiting a prestigious new director be-
came positive. Although speculative, this finding
suggests that when new directors are recruited and
CEOs feel secure in their structural power relative
to their boards, prestigious CEOs focus more on the
benefits of gaining additional prestigious affilia-
tions than on the potential loss of discretion, but
when they are less secure in their structural power,
they focus more on the threats associated with pres-
tigious new directors.
The results of our analyses predicting the
amount of prestige a new director possessed when
a new director was recruited yielded a more nu-
anced pattern of results. CEO prestige generally had
a negative, nonsignificant relationship that became
significant when a CEO was also board chairman or
company founder, although only the latter interac-
tion effect was significant. These findings are con-
sistent with our previous findings, as well as the
general argument that a prestigious CEO is likely to
be less threatened and to focus on the benefits
rather than the costs of a prestigious new director
when the CEO has other sources of power.
Our analyses also showed that founder CEOs and
CEOs with fewer outsiders on their boards were
likely to recruit more prestigious directors, while
CEOs who own larger percentages of stock were
likely to recruit less prestigious directors. Although
they should be treated as preliminary, these find-
ings, combined with the positive moderating ef-
fects previously discussed, may have significant
implications for governance research and practice.
Agency theory (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983)
and current governance “best practices,” as re-
flected, for example, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
prescribe very high levels of outside director rep-
resentation on boards as a corrective for executive
self-interest. Further, the received wisdom among
venture capitalists is that it is more often than not
best to replace founder CEOs with “more experi-
enced” leadership (Pollock et al., 2009; Wasserman,
2003). Our findings suggest that these prescriptions
may have the unintended consequence of reducing
the likelihood a company recruits the types of direc-
tors who may be more active and who bring greater
human and social capital to a board (e.g., D’Aveni &
Kesner, 1993; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Thus, like
recent research on multiple agency (e.g., Arthurs,
Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008; Kroll et al.,
2007) and the benefits of founder CEO presence
(e.g., Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Nelson, 2003), our
results suggest that rather than treating these deci-
sions in a “one size fits all” manner, future theoriz-
ing in corporate governance on the roles of board
structure and founder CEOs should more fully con-
sider both the benefits and costs of the actions
taken and recognize that which predominates may
be contingent on contextual characteristics.
Our findings (1) that CEO prestige can sometimes
have a negative relationship with recruiting a new
director and the amount of prestige a new director
possesses and (2) that greater CEO stock ownership
can also lead to recruiting less prestigious directors
highlight that having a powerful CEO can be a
double-edged sword. Further, it suggests that as-
suming different dimensions of CEO power are
equivalent in their consequences for firms may be
inappropriate. Future research should continue to
explore the ways in which different sources of CEO
power vary and how they may combine in different
ways to influence organizational outcomes.
More generally, another contribution of this
study is to the literature on the microprocesses
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underlying corporate board functioning. While
boards are comprised of members of the corporate
elite (Davis et al., 2003), they are also groups, and
they experience typical group processes such as
conflict, teamwork, cohesiveness, and consensus
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Forbes & Milliken,
1999). A considerable amount of research has ex-
amined the demographic characteristics (e.g., Dal-
ton et al., 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand,
1999), social and friendship ties (e.g., Westphal &
Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996), and interlock
patterns (e.g., Davis et al., 2003) of corporate
boards, but it has not explicitly considered the
nature of directors’ status hierarchies—either their
standing in the broader director labor market or
their standing in a board’s local status hierarchy.
We begin to consider how local status hierarchies
operate, as directors seek to balance the need to
affiliate with similar others with the need to pre-
serve their standing and power within boards. By
explicating the nuances of directors’ local status
hierarchies, we offer theoretical insights into a very
important social characteristic pervasive among the
upper echelons of corporate hierarchies.
Future Research Directions
Like all studies, this study has limitations that
create opportunities for future research. The first
opportunity arises from the actor characteristics we
considered. We examined CEO and board charac-
teristics that affected the desire to recruit presti-
gious directors, and we controlled for the number
of departures from boards. However, individual-
level factors, such as the type of director who exits,
the tenure of an exiting director, and the amount of
stock he/she owns may also be important. For ex-
ample, when VC directors who invested in a com-
pany leave its board, the firm may need to replace
a different set of skills and resources, and an actor
who had the ability to wield a great deal of power
because of the stock controlled no longer influ-
ences board deliberations. Thus, the disruption to
the internal status structure may be more signifi-
cant. Prior research has also shown that firms
sometimes stack their executive teams and boards
with prestigious individuals right before IPO in a
“hurried and careless fashion” (Chen et al., 2008:
972); thus, the departure of prestigious but shorter-
tenured directors who joined just prior to an IPO
may lead to different recruiting decisions than the
departure of longer-tenured prestigious directors.
Thus, the type and number of directors who leave
are likely to be important topics for future research.
A second opportunity for future research comes
from the fact that we did not explicitly consider what
happens when prestigious directors and CEOs differ
in their preferences. To explore this issue further, we
conducted a series of analyses that explored interac-
tions among all of the measures of CEO power, in-
cluding CEO prestige and board prestige. None of
these interactions were significant. Nonetheless, fu-
ture research should continue to explore the sociopo-
litical dynamics of CEO-board interactions and how
they influence firm outcomes.
A third opportunity arises from the fact that we
only considered whether a single prestigious direc-
tor was recruited. The patterns observed might
have varied as a function of the number of presti-
gious directors recruited (e.g., Pollock et al., 2010).
Unfortunately we were not able to explore this
issue in detail because more than two prestigious
directors were recruited in less than 1 percent of
our firm-year observations. Future research using
other samples and contexts with more variation in
the number of prestigious actors involved should
continue to explore this issue.
A fourth opportunity arises from the fact that we
were unable to consider the fourth source of CEO
power identified by Finkelstein (1992): expert power.
It is possible that CEOs with greater industry or tech-
nical expertise may feel differently about recruiting
prestigious directors than CEOs with more general
forms of experience and expertise. For example,
CEOs with high expert power may be less threatened
by prestigious directors, because even though they
are prestigious they may be less likely to challenge
the CEOs’ expertise and decisions. Future research
should continue to explore this issue.
More generally, because our measures of prestige
are based on work and educational relationships, we
are unable disambiguate the effects of prestige and
expertise in our analysis. However, our theoretical
model and the empirical relationships observed are
consistent with explanations based on prestige, and
the same logic is unlikely to apply equally to higher
levels of expertise. Nonetheless, future research
should continue to explore this issue in other con-
texts that allow for independent measurement of in-
dividuals’ levels of prestige and expertise.
Conclusion
Overall, this study has significant implications
for developing theory about newly public firms that
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strive to succeed during the rather turbulent years
following the transformational changes at IPO
(Fischer & Pollock, 2004). Understanding how
firms navigate the perceived costs and benefits of
adding prestigious directors to their boards is im-
portant to gain a richer understanding of how en-
trepreneurial firms transition through different
phases of their life cycle, and how different gover-
nance characteristics shape this process.
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